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The Meaning of the Question of Being: An Interpretation of an intrinsic Connection between Being and the No-thing in Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?
Kvapil, Ondřej ; Kouba, Pavel (advisor) ; Ritter, Martin (referee)
This paper deals, building on a ground defined by Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?, with a single question: in what sense do being and the no-thing belong together? This question is being addressed at two parallel levels. Based on a detailed interpretation of key text passages that have often been examined insufficiently due to their lack of accessibility, it aims to gain a complex insight into the issue and interpret it in its many nuances of meaning. At the same time, its aim is to articulate a general philosophical significance of the intrinsic connection between being and the no-thing; to what extent it affects the innermost intention of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as such, i.e. raising the question of the meaning of being. The paper builds on a phenomenological description of the original experience of the no-thing and captures a transformation of a human being into a pure Da-sein, which he goes through during this experience. Since the experience of the no-thing according to Heidegger is identical to the basic mood of dread, this piece of work depicts it in relation to seemingly similar, but in their meaning actually opposite moods: fear and, most importantly, abysmal boredom. Subsequently, it puts forward an interpretation of the no-thing's own ontological significance and thus...
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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The Meaning of the Question of Being: An Interpretation of an intrinsic Connection between Being and the No-thing in Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?
Kvapil, Ondřej ; Kouba, Pavel (advisor) ; Ritter, Martin (referee)
This paper deals, building on a ground defined by Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?, with a single question: in what sense do being and the no-thing belong together? This question is being addressed at two parallel levels. Based on a detailed interpretation of key text passages that have often been examined insufficiently due to their lack of accessibility, it aims to gain a complex insight into the issue and interpret it in its many nuances of meaning. At the same time, its aim is to articulate a general philosophical significance of the intrinsic connection between being and the no-thing; to what extent it affects the innermost intention of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as such, i.e. raising the question of the meaning of being. The paper builds on a phenomenological description of the original experience of the no-thing and captures a transformation of a human being into a pure Da-sein, which he goes through during this experience. Since the experience of the no-thing according to Heidegger is identical to the basic mood of dread, this piece of work depicts it in relation to seemingly similar, but in their meaning actually opposite moods: fear and, most importantly, abysmal boredom. Subsequently, it puts forward an interpretation of the no-thing's own ontological significance and thus...
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Difference of ontological difference in thinking of Martin Heidegger
Dubovec, Marcel ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Novotný, Jaroslav (referee)
DUBOVEC, M.: Difference of ontological difference in thinking of Martin Heidegger (Master's thesis) Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Aleš Novák, Ph.D. The aim of master's thesis consists in explication of ontological difference in Martin Heidegger's thinking. For this purpose is used a dual method of interpretion of difference in the concept of ontological difference. First it is the issue of the difference as such. For the understanding of this idea it is analyzed the text Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics. The second interpretation od difference concentrate on different understanding of ontological difference. The text Basic Problems of Phenomenology is presented as the opposite one, in which the ontological difference is connected with the temporality. The last part of master's thesis concerns the text On the essence of ground. With this the concept of transcendence is introduced as a subject in which the explication of ontological difference leads. Key words: ontological difference, onto-theology, ecstatic-horizontal temporality, Temporality, transcendence, understanding of Being
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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